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Abstract
This paper analyses the narrative of disinformation disseminated through the social net-
work TikTok, a network which is popular at a global level and whose users are mainly 
young or very young. To do so, a study was carried out on the content of publications on 
TikTok in four countries with different idiosyncrasies and national realities: Spain, Por-
tugal, Brazil, and the United States. Interviews were also conducted with fact-checking 
agencies on the potential for misinformation and fact-checking potential on this social 
network. The results suggest that due to its characteristics as a fresh, visual network with 
easily shareable and viral content, TikTok is a network that facilitates the spread of disin-
formation, but which in turn is a tool for debunking hoaxes beyond the range of action of 
conventional media.
Keywords: disinformation; TikTok; fake news; fact-checking
Nadia Alonso-López; Pavel Sidorenko-Bautista; Fábio 
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66 Anàlisi 64, 2021 Nadia Alonso-López; Pavel Sidorenko-Bautista; Fábio Giacomelli
Resum. Més enllà de reptes i balls virals: TikTok com a vehicle per al discurs desinformatiu i 
la verificació d’informació a Espanya, Portugal, el Brasil i els Estats Units
Aquesta recerca analitza la narrativa de la desinformació a través de la xarxa social TikTok, 
una xarxa que és tendència a escala global i els usuaris majoritaris de la qual són joves o 
molt joves. Per dur-ho a terme es fa un estudi dels continguts de publicacions a TikTok 
de quatre països amb idiosincràsies i realitats nacionals diferents com són Espanya, Portu-
gal, el Brasil i els Estats Units. Així mateix, es fan entrevistes amb agències de verificació 
de fets sobre el potencial desinformatiu i la verificació de la informació en aquesta xarxa 
social. Els resultats apunten al fet que, per les seves característiques de xarxa visual, fresca i 
amb continguts fàcilment compartibles i viralitzables, TikTok és una xarxa que facilita 
l’expansió de la desinformació, però, al seu torn, és una eina per desmentir boles fora del 
rang d’acció dels mitjans convencionals.
Paraules clau: desinformació; TikTok; notícies falses; mecanismes de verificació
Resumen. Más allá de retos y bailes virales: TikTok como vehículo para el discurso desinformativo 
y la verificación de información en España, Portugal, Brasil y Estados Unidos
Esta investigación analiza la narrativa de la desinformación a través de la red social TikTok, 
una red que es tendencia a escala global y cuyos usuarios mayoritarios son jóvenes o muy 
jóvenes. Para ello se realiza un estudio de los contenidos de publicaciones en TikTok de 
cuatro países con idiosincrasias y realidades nacionales diferentes como son España, Por-
tugal, Brasil y Estados Unidos. Asimismo, se realizan entrevistas con agencias de verifica-
ción de hechos sobre el potencial desinformativo y la verificación de información en esta 
red social. Los resultados apuntan a que, por sus características de red visual, fresca y con 
contenidos fácilmente compartibles y viralizables, TikTok es una red que facilita la expan-
sión de la desinformación, pero, a su vez, es una herramienta para desmentir bulos fuera 
del rango de acción de medios convencionales. 
Palabras clave: desinformación; TikTok; noticias falsas; mecanismos de verificación
1. Introduction
1.1. The spread of disinformation
Disinformation is a multifaceted phenomenon with diverse aspects and dif-
ferent motives, such as spoofing, causing personal or corporate damage or 
influencing electoral processes (Guallar et al. 2020). People began to talk 
about fake news after the 2016 US presidential election campaign that result-
ed in the victory of Donald Trump (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; López, 
Vives and Badell, 2018), and this event, together with the Brexit process in 
the United Kingdom and the rise of Bolsonaro to the presidency of Brazil are 
considered among the most critical moments in terms of the spread of fake 
news (Cabezuelo and Manfredi, 2019; Da Silva and Dourado, 2019; Pérez, 
Meso and Mendiguren, 2020).
While disinformation represents a broader concept and is defined as false, 
inaccurate or misleading content that deliberately seeks to cause harm or ben-
efit (European Commission, 2018), fake news refers to information with the 
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appearance of real news created with the aim of propagating a falsehood and 
misleading readers in order to obtain some kind of benefit, whether political 
or otherwise (Amorós, 2018). Salaverría et al (2020) defend the use of the 
term “hoax” to refer to false content created intentionally and disseminated 
massively through the network for the aforementioned reasons.
The spread of false content is not a recent phenomenon (Salas, 2019) and 
is related to the so-called Post-Truth Era (Keyes, 2004) characterised by 
social networks and the current hyperconnectivity in the interests of shorter, 
more immediate, instant and highly visual content (Mujika, García and 
Gibaja, 2020). 
Users appropriate Internet content and produce their own messages based 
on it (Marzal and Casero, 2017). These users play a more active role, propos-
ing multidisciplinary and multichannel dialogues while demanding new ways 
to express themselves (Li, Xiaohui and Zhengwu, 2019). 
This scenario has fostered the spread of false content primarily through 
digital media, broadening the spectrum beyond the information disseminat-
ed by mass media (Ceron, De-Lima-Santos and Quiles, 2021; Salaverría, 
2020; Sánchez and Magallón, 2020). These publications reinforce the beliefs 
of a community with a certain ideological bias, particularly in relation to pol-
itics, where dissemination is faster in comparison with other issues (Orbego-
zo, Morales-i-Gras and Larrondo, 2020), and are reaffirmed insofar as they 
refer to a reality that conforms to what people want to hear, rather than a 
reality based on evidence; i.e. so-called wishful thinking (Cassam, 2019; 
MacKenzie and Bhatt, 2020).
It is even possible to see today, for example, how through Facebook, You-
Tube, Twitter or more private social networks such as WhatsApp, democrat-
ic and electoral systems can be significantly undermined as a result of this 
(Bharali and Goswami, 2018; Grinberg et al, 2019). 
This asymmetrical context and the increasing spread of false or specula-
tive content has prompted journalists, news media and news agencies to cre-
ate verification channels through which users can check whether a news item 
is true or false (Vázquez, Vizoso and López, 2019; Terol and Alonso, 2020; 
García-Ortega and García-Avilés, 2021), as well as different governments 
around the world to legislate in this regard (Meneses, 2018) and even social 
networks such as Twitter, Facebook and Snapchat themselves to apply mech-
anisms such as that implemented specifically at the beginning of 2021 with 
the digital veto against Donald Trump, while on other more recent plat-
forms such as TikTok, for the time being, it is the algorithm that acts as 
arbiter and censor.
1.2. The social network TikTok
TikTok is a social network created from the foundations of Music.ly, a pre-
decessor also owned by the Chinese company ByteDance, in which a message 
code has been developed around entertainment with large quantities of visual 
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stimuli, which involves a great deal of dynamism, speed of production, con-
sumption of content and creative demand (Li et al., 2019; Shuai, Yuzhen and 
Yifang, 2019). In short, it relies on communication consisting of playbacks, 
funny stories and “mind-soothing” content (Yu-Liang, Chun-Chin and Shu-
Ming, 2019).
It is a platform that has exceeded 800 million users worldwide, position-
ing itself as the most downloaded mobile app in the first quarter of 2020 
(315 million installations worldwide) (Ditrendia, 2020). Its users are mostly 
‘Generation Z’ (Rapkin, 2017; Shuai et al., 2019) although it is true that 
over the course of 2020 it reported a significant increase in Millennials and 
even ‘Generation X’ users as a consequence of the first strict lockdowns 
resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Its nature as a digital trend has prompted broadcasters of all kinds, includ-
ing the media and journalists (Sidorenko, Herranz and Cantero, 2020; 
Vázquez, Negreira and López, 2020) to innovate by quickly adapting to such 
a particular message code and heterogeneous audience.
However, it is not precisely the latter interlocutors who enjoy the greatest 
popularity and, therefore, the greatest audience. Since most consumers are 
still very young people, it can be considered a priori that the community of 
users of this social network is not always the best interlocutor for certain top-
ics, which involves superficiality in some cases, or conversely, misrepresenta-
tion of certain data.
However, according to Van den Bremer and Siebelink (2020), TikTok 
users have a more critical view and participation in the content they consume 
through this platform only when they are genuinely interested in the subject, 
with a very common approach being to view the comment box to check it.
This is in line with Tan (2013) on YouTube usage habits, although they 
argue that this is still a superficial mechanism as there is no evidence of any 
attempt to check the information through other digital channels outside the 
social network. However, most of these users are concerned about their 
image and personal brand, so they often think carefully about what they are 
going to post, a practice that had already been emerging in young audience 
segments on other social networks (Vogel and Rose, 2016; Omar and 
Dequan, 2020).
TikTok has represented a major digital channel for the dissemination of 
information related, for example, to the COVID-19 pandemic (Basch, Hillyer 
and Jaimie, 2020), not only through the actions of official profiles such as 
that of the World Health Organisation, but also by individual users who, 
through specific hashtags, have allowed specialists to get a closer look at users’ 
habits in relation to the pandemic, with the impressions and disinformation 
risks that any social network entails.
Likewise, as on other social networks, TikTok attempts to control the 
flow of speculative and biased videos (Ballesteros, 2020). However, as has 
been happening on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat, to refer to 
the social networks with the largest number of users worldwide, on TikTok 
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there is a significant flow of content that encourages disinformation uninten-
tionally, but, above all, also intentionally.
Referring to more specific and recent contexts, during the US presidential 
elections in 2020, a large amount of content which was considered false went 
viral on this social network, which has been removed by the platform itself, as 
reported by The Guardian newspaper on 06/11/20 (see <http://bit.ly/ 
3qprqQE>). There is even evidence of the creation of sensationalist media 
that also engages in disinformation, as in the case of the @notimundo profile 
(see <http://bit.ly/3oRzvNt>). 
2. Methodology
Given that this is a global digital trend and that it largely involves young and 
very young audiences, the main aim of this paper is to determine whether 
there is inaccurate, speculative or false content on TikTok, and how it is con-
structed narratively, especially during the year 2020, a complex period as a 
consequence of COVID-19 and various global political episodes that have 
generated negative effects in the field of information, such as “infoxication” 
(López, 2020) due to an excess of content referring especially to the delicate 
health situation, as well as an “infodemic” (Papapicco, 2020) as a conse-
quence of the flood – in the form of a parallel pandemic – of false news and 
related hoaxes.
Specifically, the questions posed in this regard are: What is the type of 
profile that creates hoaxes or misinforms through TikTok? How does the 
user community react to misinformation content on TikTok? Are they aware 
of it? What type of narrative describes the hoax or inaccurate content? Are 
there common or general characteristics?
Therefore, the initial hypotheses are:
H1: TikTok is a platform prone to misinformation, as are other social 
networks with a history of misinformation.
H2: The user community easily responds positively to disinformation 
content.
H3: False and inaccurate posts come from fake profiles dedicated to dis-
seminating disinformation.
H4: Fake and inaccurate content gets high levels of engagement which 
gives it more visibility in the social network’s algorithm.
For the purposes of the research, we propose an analysis of the content of 
publications on this social network in four countries (two European and two 
American) with different idiosyncrasies and national identities: Spain, Portu-
gal, Brazil and the United States.
This is a preliminary and exploratory survey based on content selected by 
the researchers after an extensive review of hashtags with high levels of 
engagement in relation to current affairs or which expressly refer to disinfor-
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mation: #vivaespaña (90.8 million views), #Trump2020 (18.48 thousand 
million views), #usa (31 thousand million views), #covidfake (424,800 views) 
#eleicoes2020 (211.6 million views), #bolsonaro (1.1 billion views), 
#antoniocosta (2.3 million views) and #marcelorebelodesousa (6.6 million 
views).
The particular case of #usa was taken into consideration due to the fact 
that many contents associated with other tags such as #Trump2020 or 
#covidfake also included it, which aroused suspicion in the content analysis.
The survey was carried out up to the 31st of December 2020, taking as a 
reference 10 profiles per country, for a total of 40 contents, listed in an assess-
ment table by country with the following study variables: username, profile 
type, number of followers, ‘likes’ of the profile, narrative characteristics of the 
content, number of comments resulting from the content, number of times 
the content was shared, ‘likes’. A brief description of each content will also be 
included under the results heading.
The selection of the posts was determined by the thematic proposal, rath-
er than by any specific engagement indicator. This has thus allowed for a 
fairly wide range of possibilities that will reveal a variety of expressions of 
interaction between the user community and false or misleading content.
The types of user profile were classified as follows: 
 — (IU) individual user 
 — (PF) public figure
 — NGO
 — (PO) political organisation
 — (FP) fake profile 
In addition, the narrative features were established as:
 — (S) selfie
 — (UN) user does not appear
 — (CH) challenge
 — (MU) music
 — (TX) text
In this respect, a selfie (S) refers to a video in which the person records 
him/herself with the front camera of the mobile device. User does not appear 
(UN) refers to accounts in which, from the profile picture to all content, the 
user remains anonymous and does not reveal his or her identity. Challenges 
(CH) refer to challenges and impersonations that are part of the intrinsic 
dynamics of the TikTok user community. Music (MU) is an important vari-
able for the visualisation of the content by the platform’s algorithm and is 
often used to emphasise an idea or image. Finally, text (TX) refers to any 
messages that reinforce or attempt to enforce or influence the understanding 
of specific images.
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The measurement of the number of times the content examined was 
shared is limited only to the record provided by TikTok, which is partial data 
because this social network has the special feature of offering the possibility 
of sharing its content through any social network and digital platform, such 
as WhatsApp, Facebook or Instagram, which makes it impossible to carry out 
such measurements in each external medium, given the replicating effect that 
many of these have.
In order to obtain a professional assessment of this phenomenon and the 
special nature of the TikTok social network, ‘fact-checkers’ were consulted in 
the form of a structured interview about the potential work they carry out 
through this channel, publishing or monitoring the flow of content, their 
opinion on the informative qualities of the platform and the potential com-
plexity of the platform, both in terms of its audience and the ease with which 
its content can be transferred to other social networks. Thus, after several 
attempts to contact the most representative verification media in the coun-
tries surveyed, Maldita.es (Spain) and Lupa (Brazil) finally participated, as 
well as Cotejo (Venezuela), the latter as an observer from a country which, 
although not part of the sample, is working in a national context in which there 
are many complaints about disinformation in the absence of impartial con-
ventional media and a constant persecution of journalists.
The questions asked were about the reasons for having an active profile 
on TikTok, whether they consider a specific audience segment as part of this 
initiative, whether they monitor or have considered monitoring TikTok con-
tent, whether they consider TikTok to be a complex social network for the 
verification of fake news and hoaxes, and what they think about the flow of 
disinformation through this social network.
3. Results
There is no standard profile to define the typical “digital disinformer” on 
TikTok. In Table 5, based on the data obtained from Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4, it 
is possible to see that in Europe and America, at first glance, disinformation 
comes from individual users (IU), who typically post selfies (S) or simply 
videos from other digital platforms, where they are obviously unrecognisable 
(UN) (see Table 6). However, in any of the most common cases, texts are an 
important resource for reaffirming the biased idea that the user is trying to 
put across through multimedia content.
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Table 1. Disinformation content produced in Spain on TikTok up to the 31st of December 
2020
Regarding the profile Content: characteristics and 
engagement

























IU 377000 7.8 
millions
























IU 1305 20400 S-MU-TX 239 53 2863
Source: Own compilation.
Of the four countries surveyed, the second profile associated with disin-
formation content was the so-called “fake profile” (FP), such as cases 1, 6 and 
7 (Table 1) 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9 (Table 2) 1, 3 and 7 (Table 3) and 3, 9 and 10 
(Table 4), in which it can be seen that there is no specific publication theme, 
with their feeds being full of unconnected videos, where it is common to see 
humorous content interspersed with other political or “technical-scientific” 
content. 
Cases such as number 1 in Table 1, whose description states that its feed 
consists of humour and politics, illustrates this situation. This particular feed has 
high levels of engagement, which results in greater promotion of the content by 
the algorithm.
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Table 2. Disinformation content produced in Portugal on TikTok up to the 31st of December 
2020
Regarding the profile Content: characteristics and 
engagement















































IU 4782 9601 UN 0 25 67
Source: Own compilation.
In Portugal and Brazil, disinformation content is more focused on poli-
tics, in some cases referring to the issue of the COVID-19 vaccination. There 
are even ‘Deepfake’ videos where the face of an individual is replaced, in this 
case, by that of the president of Portugal (cases 8 and 10 Table 2), attributing 
words or acts to him that have not really happened, misrepresenting his 
actions to very young, less informed audiences, either voluntarily or involun-
tarily, as Casero-Ripollés (2020) points out.
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Table 3. Disinformation content produced in Brazil on TikTok up to the 31st of December 
2020
Regarding the profile Content: characteristics and 
engagement













































IU 3746 86400 UN-TX 143 172 660
Source: Own compilation.
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Table 4. Disinformation content produced in the United States on TikTok up to the 31st of 
December 2020
Regarding the profile Content: characteristics and 
engagement
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Perhaps the most sensitive cases have been seen in the United States 
(Table 4), where politics is mixed – often in a forced manner – with the 
health situation, with conspiracy theories of various kinds or with the sup-
posed existence of superior races that are the ones who really manage the 
future of the planet, as in the case of the ‘reptilian’ theory (case 5 Table 4).
The first content in Table 4 is noteworthy in that it refers to a particular 
situation of racial hatred, with comments disabled, which has prevented the 
user community from expressing themselves accordingly. The video shows 
alleged footage from a security camera at the entrance to a private home, 
where a delivery man apparently exclaims that the person he is about to deliv-
er to is a racist, so he decides to throw the package at the door.
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The user who posted this video indicates with complementary text that 
the subject’s reaction is due to the pro-Donald Trump flags in the person’s 
garden (which are not visible in the footage).
Although the video may or may not be authentic, it is difficult to deter-
mine whether the voice that can be heard is really that of the delivery person 
in question or a fabrication. Also, as the flags in question are not visible, it 
could be a video taken out of context and biased by the accompanying text.
Table 5. Type of disinformation user profile by country (review up to the 31st of December 
2020)
Country IU PF NGO PO FP
Spain 7 0 0 0 3
Portugal 3 2 0 0 5
Brazil 7 0 0 0 3
USA 6 1 0 0 3
Total 24 3 0 0 13
Source: Own compilation.
In the sample surveyed, there was no evidence of disinformation content 
by political parties or non-governmental organisations, although some videos 
from parties such as VOX in Spain, or actions carried out through other dig-
ital platforms have led to the creation of fake accounts or the potential radi-
calisation of some users, who publish as if they were intermediaries of these 
ideas, which are ultimately false and end up fuelling hatred and social antag-
onism, as can be seen in the comments of cases 1 (Table 1), 7 (Table 3) or 5 
(Table 4), for example.
Table 6. Most used type of narrative by disinformation profile (review up to the 31st of 
December 2020)




Music (MU) Text (TX)
IU 9 12 1 7 16
PF 0 3 0 0 3
NGO 0 0 0 0 0
PO 0 0 0 0 0
FP 0 14 0 3 7
Total 9 29 1 10 26
Source: Own compilation.
According to the data shown in Table 6, the narrative practice most used 
in content classified as disinformation on TikTok is the publication of a 
video fragment taken out of context and coming from another digital plat-
form, accompanied by some text that influences the observation and inter-
pretation of the content by the user community.
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4. Discussion and conclusions
From the sampling carried out, the content of the four countries analysed can 
be considered to fulfil the first hypothesis put forward, since it is indeed easy 
to spread disinformation through TikTok, with “individual users” who are 
not related – at least not publicly – to specific political parties or organisa-
tions, using generic hashtags on most occasions and challenges unrelated to 
the proposed content, but with high popularity rates. 
The attempt to use high-visibility hashtags to try to increase the reach of 
content is noteworthy, although this has begun to be penalised by the algo-
rithm, as stated by TikTok Spain’s own staff (see <http://bit.ly/2LZgbPD>).
Individual profiles are the most likely to create this type of false content, 
which confirms the third hypothesis, since the false or inaccurate informa-
tion comes from fake profiles dedicated to spreading disinformation, but, on 
the other hand, with a significant presence of individual users who also publish 
other types of content, leading other people to give them greater credibility.
It is worth noting that users do not always react positively to these posts, 
this being evident on occasions involving content with a political and 
health-related tone, where the user community has reacted negatively. 
Although this does not necessarily prevent them spreading and going viral, it 
does generate contradiction with them, as in cases 9 (Table 1) 1, 5, 7 and 10 
(Table 2) 9 (Table 3) and, 9 and 10 (Table 4), and this does not allow the 
second hypothesis to be confirmed.
It is necessary to distinguish between users who show a clear political ten-
dency, in some cases bordering on fanaticism, and express this in their posts, 
and disinformation content of a political, health, environmental, etc. nature, 
whose discourse may be more effective as the users themselves are not aware 
that it is fake content, and the spread of disinformation is not possible if 
there are no recipients to confirm and spread this fake content. 
With regard to the fourth hypothesis on engagement and the operability 
of the TikTok algorithm, it was observed that fake content as such is not 
always the type of content that obtains the highest visibility. However, the 
algorithm is indeed conditioned by posts in which the fake content is pre-
sented in a humorous way, even if it deals with political issues. 
A noteworthy example of this is case 1 (Table 1) entitled “Pedro Sánchez 
resignation”, which is not satirical content, but the sender is a profile with 
high levels of engagement in general terms. The large number of followers it 
has (34,200) gives it a large audience, which broadens the possibilities of 
exposure, as these recipients are then free to extract the content from the 
platform and divert it to other digital channels according to their interests. 
The strategy of interspersing biased political content with other humorous 
non-political posts has allowed the profile to engage an audience that is large 
in number and potentially receptive to its message.
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Figure 1. Video of political interest on TikTok profile defined as satirical (Video 1, Table 1)
Source: TikTok profile of @viva_espnaaa.
While in Brazil the disinformation and fake content refers to the context 
of politics and health (political criticism is not directed at the national gov-
ernment but rather at regional and local authorities), in Portugal it is more 
difficult to determine the specific reasons for spreading disinformation, 
although a tendency towards irony and humour is detected in the dissemina-
tion of fake content, also with a special emphasis on politics and, above all, 
on the figure of the president of the government and the prime minister.
Figure 2. Video from Brazil in which a local government is accused of mismanagement of 
public roads, something which is later refuted as it is neither the place nor the work in ques-
tion (Video 7, Table 3)
Source: TikTok profile of @luiz_ricardo7.
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However, this is not – for the moment – a scenario of serious political 
polarisation, although it is true that in 2020 there has been greater media 
exposure of André Ventura, representative of Chega, a far-right party, the 
only one in this country to have a profile on TikTok, but still with very low 
levels of engagement. Similarly, it cannot be ruled out that in time this sce-
nario will change, and political content will increase and become more rele-
vant on TikTok.
Conversely, in Spain, growing political polarisation does have a more vis-
ible impact than other topics on fake content and disinformation work on 
this social network. Most of the cases reviewed here (9 out of 10) refer to 
issues that have to do with discourse against the government, political repre-
sentatives or the parties themselves, both in their economic and health man-
agement, specifically in relation to COVID-19. 
Example 9 (Table 1) is even more striking because the person who pub-
lishes it is a girl who engages in posting the State budgets applied during the 
mandate of the different government presidents of the democratic era. Her 
final argument is that the socialist Pedro Sánchez bases his administration on 
the budgets of the previous conservative-led administration, alleging the 
socialist’s inability to approve new national budgets. She reinforces this expla-
nation with the phrase “STOP FAKE NEWS”, although this may seem a 
contradiction (see Figures 3 and 4).
Figures 3 and 4. Political TikTok post with handling of data without source references 
(Video 9, Table 1)
   
Source: TikTok profile of @anitaa.98.
Finally, in the United States, the 2020 presidential elections led to one of 
the most complex scenarios in terms of the flow of politically charged disinfor-
mation content on TikTok, which in many cases inevitably became inter-
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twined with the health situation resulting from COVID-19, as Pablo Hernán-
dez of Maldita.es states, and as can be seen in the cases listed in Table 4. 
This disinformation scenario becomes more complex when hybridised 
with messages that support conspiracy theories of various kinds, as in cases 3, 
4 and 5 in Table 4, for example. 
Figures 5, 6 and 7. Political TikTok post linking the Covid-19 virus to the number of the 
Beast and Joe Biden’s US 2020 campaign (Video 3, Table 4)
      
Source: TikTok profile of @aplhadavis0005.
As Table 6 shows, at present, disinformation on TikTok is narratively 
determined by individual users, most of them fake profiles, who insert videos 
and photos from other digital platforms, taken out of context and reinforced 
with biased texts. 
In view of this situation, several journalists and specialists have now seen 
the need to apply verification criteria and participate in TikTok. Thus, Agen-
cia Lupa (Brazil) and Maldita.es (Spain) justify their profiles on this channel 
as being a consequence of the rapid expansion of the social network during 
the first strict lockdowns imposed as a result of COVID-19, due to the fact 
that it is a “network used mainly by young people who may be more vulnera-
ble to fake news and because it is a trending platform”.
Maldita.es has been monitoring the social network since 2019 and gener-
ates educational content because, according to Pablo Hernández (Maldita.
es), “it is necessary to act by creating TikTok format denials and providing 
truthful information through the social network itself”. Lupa, meanwhile, 
tends to intervene on the basis of fake content sent to them by users them-
selves. Both fact-checkers consider it important to create content in the mes-
sage code that the platform itself imposes, in order to achieve a better reach.
Beyond challenges and viral dance moves Anàlisi 64, 2021 81
From Venezuela, Karla Torres de Cotejo warns that although TikTok is a 
very popular social network among young people, this does not imply that it is 
a medium prone to a greater flow of disinformation and fake content. TikTok 
is not a platform where users go specifically to seek information – quite the 
contrary. However, on the way through the main feed, they do come across 
information and, therefore, also disinformation and fake content. 
The content consumption proposed in TikTok is not designed to pro-
mote profiles but specific content. Users construct their “news” and “reality” 
with what the algorithm proposes in the feed, which is not necessarily made 
up of the accounts followed. This algorithm volatilises a large amount of con-
tent, which is likely to escalate rapidly, making the platform vulnerable to dis-
information, which is currently incipient, but which, as it continues to grow, 
could become a more serious problem.
According to the latest State of Mobile Devices 2021 report from the App 
Annie consultancy (see <http://bit.ly/3nNrTdv>), people tend to spend more 
time on TikTok (20 hours in 2020) than on Facebook (16 hours in 2020), 
and more time connected to mobile devices than to conventional TV: in the 
US almost 4 hours per day and in Brazil almost 5 hours per day, for example.
Curiously, in contrast, due to its status as a trending network, the current 
convergence of so many audience segments and the fact that it is a platform 
where the tone of the message is fresh and dynamic, it seems that TikTok is 
seeking to gradually and organically establish itself as a more expeditious and 
accessible way to disprove fake news outside the range of action of conven-
tional media, as in the case of the report of the “fake snow” in Madrid in 
January 2021 (see <http://bit.ly/39EoLvC>), even providing the possibility 
of the emergence of new journalistic and/or information proposals such as 
@holajulen <http://bit.ly/2XNyKsM>, @veronicafumanal <http://bit.ly/ 
3sxMeHx> and @ac2alityespanol <http://bit.ly/3sx60mb>.
This paper has attempted to advance the differentiation of the potential 
disinformation narrative on TikTok with regard to other social digital plat-
forms, with the aim of enriching the study of this type of statement and thus 
adding a new resource to the respective analysis in order to mitigate the 
scourge of lies and speculation in today’s digital society.
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